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LACEY MARK SIVAK,
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)

CASE NO. 41392-2013
Ada County No. 1981-10183

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
In 1981, Defendant Lacey Mark Sivak (Sivak) was convicted for the first-degree
murder of Dixie Wilson and sentenced to death. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
denial of sentencing-phase relief resulting in a new sentencing hearing before the state
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district court.

Sivak appeals from his fixed life sentence imposed after the new

sentencing hearing, and the denial of his pro se Rule 3 5 motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The facts leading to Sivak's conviction for first-degree murder are summarized in
State v. Sivak (Sivak I), 105 Idaho 900, 992, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), as follow:
On April 6, 1981, Dixie Wilson, an attendant at a self service gas
station, was discovered near death by a customer. She had been stabbed
numerous times and shot several times. Evidence indicated she had also
been sexually molested. She later died from her wounds.
Witnesses saw two men inside the station with Wilson shortly
before the murder, one they identified as Randall Bainbridge. Appellant
and Bainbridge were seen together before and after the killing.
Appellant admitted being present during the robbery and murder,
but claimed he was merely an innocent bystander. He claimed he did not
participate in the robbery and murder and did not carry a firearm.
However, appellant's fingerprint was found on the murder weapon.
Evidence indicated appellant had previously worked at the station,
was known to the victim, had expressed animosity toward her, and had
called to inquire who would be on duty at the station on April 6, 1981.
The gun used in the attack was found in a storage shed rented by
appellant.
An Amended Information was filed charging Sivak with first-degree murder with
alternatives for premeditated and felony-murder, robbery, use of a firearm during the
robbery and murder, and a persistent violator enhancement. (#14435, R., pp.83-84.) 1
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On November 4, 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order Augmenting Appeal,
ordering that the appeal record in this case be augmented "to include the Court File,
Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 14435." The state \Vill
refer to documents from the direct appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court's Docket No.
14435. The state's reference to the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record in this case
will only be referenced by "R." and "Tr." While there are two volumes of transcript, the
only transcript utilized by the state is the sentencing hearing conducted between August
26, 2013 and August 28, 2013. Sivak's opening brief will be referenced by "Brief."
2

The jury found Sivak not guilty of premeditated murder, but guilty of felony-murder,
robbery, and possession of a firearm. (Id., pp.103-08). The district court sentenced Sivak
to death for Dixie's murder.

(Id., pp.134-41). 2 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed

Sivak's conviction and death sentence. Sivak I, supra.
The district court denied Sivak's first post-conviction petition. State v. Sivak
(Sivak II), 112 Idaho 197, 199, 731 P.2d 192 (1987). The Idaho Supreme Court vacated
Sivak's robbery conviction, concluding it "merged as a lesser included offense into his
felony murder conviction as charged." Id. at 213. The court also reversed Sivak's death
sentence because the district court denied his motion to present additional mitigation
evidence prior to the court reimposing his death sentence. Id. at 200-03.
On remand, the district court again sentenced Sivak to death.

State v. Sivak

(Sivak III), 119 Idaho 320,321, 806 P.2d 413 (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court reversed
Sivak's death sentence because the district court failed to properly weigh the aggravating
factors against the mitigating factors pursuant to State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774
P.2d 299 (1989). Sivak III, 119 Idaho at 321-22.
On remand, Sivak was again sentenced to death with the district court finding four
statutory aggravating factors, including: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances
stmounding its commission, Sivak exhibited utter disregard for human life; (3) the
murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and accompanied with the
specific intent to cause the death of a human being; and (4) Sivak exhibited a propensity
to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. State v.
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Because the district court failed to deliver its written findings in open court, the Idaho
Supreme Court remanded for reimposition of his sentence. Sivak I, 105 Idaho at 901 n.1.
3

Sivak (Sivak IV), 127 Idaho 387, 392 901 P.2d 494 (1995). Sivak subsequently filed a
post-conviction petition, which the district court denied. Id. at 389. The Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed Sivak's death sentence and the denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at 394.
Sivak next commenced federal habeas proceedings. Sivak v. State (Sivak V), 134
Idaho 641, 643, 8 P.3d 636 (2000). 3 The federal district court denied Sivak all habeas
relief. Sivak v. Hardison, 2008 WL 782877 (D. Idaho 2008). While the Ninth Circuit
affirmed all guilt-phase issues, it reversed a sentencing claim stemming from suppression
of exculpatory evidence and false testimony associated with Jimmy Leytham, who
testified at Sivak's trial that Sivak confessed to murdering Dixie. Sivak v. Hardison, 658
F.3d 898 (9

th

Cir. 2011). Sivak's case was remanded to the federal district court with

instructions to enter an appropriate order requiring the state to resentence Sivak.
On remand to the state district court, the state filed an amended notice of intent to
seek the death penalty (R., pp.178-80), which was later withdrawn (id., pp.392-93). After
a three-day hearing (Tr. 8-26-13

8-28-13), on August 28, 2013, the district court

sentenced Sivak to fixed life without the possibility of parole for Dixie's first-degree
murder (R., pp.529-31). A timely Notice of Appeal was filed September 3, 2013. (Id.,
pp.532-35.) On September 5, 2013, Sivak filed a prose "ICR 35(c and b) Request by
Lacey to Correct Illegal Sentence" contending "life without parole means thirty years,"
that he should therefore be released because his sentence allegedly "expired" on April 8,
2011, and his sentence was illegal because his resentencing was not conducted before a
jury. (Id., pp.542-45) (capitalization altered) (emphasis and quotes omitted).
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During litigation of his federal habeas case, Sivak filed his third post-conviction
petition, which the district court denied. Id. at 644. The Idaho Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Sivak V, supra.
4

ISSUES
Sivak phrases the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Imposed A
Sentence Of Life Without The Possibility Of Parole Upon Mr.
Sivak Following His Conviction For First-Degree Felony Murder?

2.

Did The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Mr.
Sivak's Idaho Criminal Rule Motion Challenging His Sentence?

The state wishes to rephrase the issues as follows:
1.

Has Sivak failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
fixed life sentence for Dixie's first-degree murder?

2.

Because the issue of leniency was not raised in Sivak's Rule 35 motion before the
district court, is this Court barred from addressing the merits of his claim?

ARGUMENT

I.
Sivak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction
Sivak contends he presented significant mitigation to the district court that

justified the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence, which the district court failed to
"adequately consider," including: (1) his age at the time he murdered Dixie; (2) his
alleged potential for rehabilitation; (3) his current "health challenges," including the
reoccurrence of bladder cancer that is currently in remission; (4) an "abusive childhood";
(5) substance abuse; and (6) continued family support. While the state does not dispute
that evidence supporting these factors may constitute mitigation, there is no indication
they were inadequately considered by the district court. Moreover, the underlying record
disproves any reasonable inference that Sivak can ever be rehabilitated.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion." State v.
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted). "In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence
where reasonable minds might differ." Id.

C.

Sivak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing Sentence
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise of

discretion are well established. Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Windom,
150 Idaho 873,875,253 P.3d 310 (2011); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d
217 (2008). To carry this burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under
any reasonable view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875 (citations omitted). A
sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective
of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
retribution. Id. at 875-76; State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,577, 38 P.3d 614 (2001).
First-degree murder, whether by premeditation or felony-murder, is punishable by
death or fixed life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-4004 (1981 ). Because his fixed life sentence
is within the statutory limit, Sivak bears the burden on appeal of showing that his
sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,604, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989). On
appeal, the question is not what sentence this Court would have imposed, but rather,
whether the district court abused its discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49; see also
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Windom, 150 Idaho at 875 ("[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion
vested in the trial court will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the
trial court with its own."). Sivak has not demonstrated from the record any abuse of
discretion in the district court's determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was
not only warranted, but necessary under the facts of this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "To impose a fixed life sentence requires a
high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely released back into
society or that the nature of the offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his
life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149; State v.
Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227 (1999)) (internal quotations and emphasis
omitted).

However, it must be recognized that Idaho's sentencing scheme does not

mandate judicial findings of fact, nor is the district court '"required to recite or check off
the sentencing guidelines ... during sentencing, nor is it even required to give reasons for
imposing the sentence."' Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149 (quoting State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho
682, 688, 991 P.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1999)). Therefore, irrespective of whether the district
court made explicit findings supporting Sivak's fixed life sentence cir failed to reference
all of the mitigation considered, this Court is permitted to review the record to determine
whether his fixed life sentence is warranted. See Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149-150.
Sivak's first-degree murder of Dixie is obviously an "offense so egregious that it
demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence." Cross, 132
Idaho at 672. As explained at Sivak's trial, on April 6, 1981, at approximately 6:20 a.m.
Harry Wilson (Harry) saw his wife, Dixie, leave their residence and go to work at a gas
station. (#14435, Tr., pp.64-65.) Harry knew Sivak had worked at the same gas station
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with Dixie before Sivak was fired approximately one month earlier because he was
making false accusations against Dixie and making unnecessary phone calls. (Id., pp.66,
68-71, 481-83 ). On April 4, just two days earlier, David Kartchner, an employee at the
station, received a telephone call from an individual he believed was Sivak asking if the
station would be open the following Monday, what time it would open, and who would
be working. (Id., pp.509-10.) Kartchner explained the station was opening at 7:00 a.m.
on Monday and Dixie would be working. (Id.)
At approximately 6:35 a.m. on April 6, Timothy Ayres passed the gas station on
his way home from work and saw Dixie behind the teller's booth; no one else was at the
station. (Id., pp.89-92.) At approximately 6:45 a.m., Gary Chilton went inside the station
and saw Dixie sitting behind the counter, but she was non-responsive to questions or
conversation with two men present, one standing by the counter and the other standing to
Chilton's right, who Chilton subsequently identified in a photo lineup as Randall
Bainbridge, Sivak's co-defendant.

(Id., pp.263-72.)

After unsuccessfully trying to

engage the individuals in conversation, Chilton paid for his gas and left. (Id., pp.282-83.)
Gloria Layden arrived at the station at approximately 6:47 a.m., pulling up next to
Dixie's car. (Id., pp.286-89.)

While she never saw Dixie that morning, from her car

Layden saw two men, the larger of the two standing beside the Coke machine and the
other "squatting on the stool or stooping a little looking into the drawer making
movements like that." (Id., pp.291-92.) "The drawer" was "where the till is" and the
"movements" were "like he was going through the draw because he was moving fast."
(Id., pp.292-93.) In a photo lineup, Layden identified the man beside the Coke machine
as Sivak. (Id., pp.296-97.) After observing Sivak talk with the other man and while
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walking toward the door, Layden decided she should leave and went home. (Id., pp.29899.) John Russell, controller for Baird Oil, subsequently determined $185 in cash and
$200 in checks was missing. (Id., pp.464-66, 476.)
At approximately 6:50 a.m., Ronald Hase arrived at the station, pumped his gas,
walked to the pay window where a male hand "came out," paid for the gas, and walked
away. (Id., pp.307-10.) John Roe arrived at the station at approximately 7:00 a.m. and
waited for the pumps to turn on. (Id., pp.319-20.) James Bell arrived at the station just
ahead of Roe. (Id., pp.320-21, 328-30.) Bell went inside because the pumps were not
working, heard someone gasping for air and found Dixie lying on the floor. (Id., pp.33032.) Bell went outside to get help from Roe who rushed inside and also saw Dixie lying
on the floor in "pretty bad" condition, naked from the top of her breasts down to her pants
because her bra and shirt had been pulled up. (Id., pp.320-25.)
Officer Gary Thurston, who saw Dixie enter the station in a "perfectly normal
state" at approximately 6:32 a.m., was the first officer to arrive.

(Id., pp.334-36.)

Thurston went inside, found Dixie lying on the floor, and saw the till open with loose
change inside but no bills, and an empty money bag.

(Id., pp.349-52.) Dixie was

transported to an emergency room (id., pp.367-70) where she died at 8:50 a.m. (id.,
pp.13-14).
An autopsy was performed on Dixie's body. (Id., pp.19-20.) Dr. Delbert Scott
concluded there were approximately twenty stab wounds on Dixie's body that could have
been caused by a knife blade found at the murder scene and/or the tip of another knife
blade, along with numerous other stab wounds that were insignificant and superficial.
(Id., pp.43-44, 50-52.) Dr. Scott also found five gunshot entry wounds in Dixie's head or

9

neck, one that was consistent with her being in the "prone position" at the time of the
shooting.

(Id., pp.44-49.)

Dr. Scott recovered bullets consistent with a .22 caliber

weapon (id., p.48) and used an X-ray to locate the tip of a knife blade that was imbedded
in Dixie's skull (id., pp.51-52). Dr. Scott determined the cause of death was gunshot
wounds to Dixie's head. (Id., p.53.)
At the murder scene, bullets were recovered. (Id., pp.379-81.) Officers obtained
a warrant to search Sivak's rented storage shed and found a .22 handgun, a small
derringer, a box of .22 caliber shells, and an extra cylinder, all "secreted in the old junked
body of an automobile, inside the right-front light area of the car, the fender." (Id.,
pp.663-68, 685-91.) The .22 handgun, derringer, and extra cylinder had been stolen
between March 15 and April 1, 1980, from Glen Romie who sold guns and employed
Sivak's mother, Marion Sivak (Marion). (Id., pp.641-51.) Romie saw Sivak in the store
between March 30 and April 1, when Sivak told Romie he had taken some BB pellets and
put them in the cabinet where the .22 was kept; the following day the guns were missing.
(Id., pp.651-53.) Wally Baker conducted ballistics testing and opined one of the bullets
recovered from the murder scene "had been fired" from the .22, the second bullet "could
have" been fired from the .22, and the bullet recovered from Dixie's skull "was [] fired"
from the .22 recovered from Sivak's shed. (Id., pp.825-27.) Bernice Noyes conducted
fingerprint analysis on the .22 and determined Sivak's fingerprints were on the barrel of
the gun while there were no prints belonging to Bainbridge. (Id., pp.791-97.)
Officers recovered Sivak's shirt worn the morning of Dixie's murder (id., pp.694704, 727-29) and obtained a warrant to search a 1972 Mercury Montego belonging to
Marion (id., pp.714-16).

Luminol testing inside the car revealed positive results for
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blood. (Id., pp.753-55.) Sivak's shirt (id., pp.759-66) and the inside of the barrel and
outside rim of the barrel of the .22 (id., pp.766-67) also tested positive for blood.
On the day of Dixie's murder, Sivak telephoned Randy Mick at approximately
8:00 p.m., inquired whether Mick had heard about the murder, and told Mick he had been
at the station at 6:30 a.m. for about fifteen minutes because a friend wanted to buy
cigarettes. (Id., pp.516-18.) Sivak also talked with Don Stephan that same night stating
he and a friend had been at the station about twenty minutes prior to the murder to get
gas. (Id., pp.636-38.)
Two days after Dixie's murder, Sivak was interviewed by Vaughn Killeen and
admitted, "he and Dixie Wilson did not get along with each other." (Id., p.675.) Sivak
contended he picked up Bainbridge at approximately 6:30 a.m. on the morning of Dixie's
murder and they went to the gas station to purchase cigarettes where they stayed for
approximately five minutes talking with Dixie.

(Id., pp.676-77.)

Sivak denied any

involvement in Dixie's murder, suggesting a possible suspect was Mike Hammer, who
allegedly threatened an employee at the station. (Id., p.675.)
Sivak testified at his trial and attempted to repudiate his statements to Killeen that
he knew nothing about Dixie's murder. (Id., pp.904-05.) Sivak contended he had been
asked by Bainbridge to help fix a van, picked up Bainbridge at his residence, went to the
gas station to get cigarettes, and saw Bainbridge pull out a gun and state, "This is a
robbery." (Id., pp.871-879.) Sivak contended he did not know Bainbridge had a gun or
was planning on robbing Dixie, but thought "it was some kind of weird joke." (Id.,
p.879.) Sivak contended Bainbridge "smack[ed] [Dixie] in the back of the head" and she
"drop[ped] down on the floor." (Id., pp.882-83.) Sivak did nothing because Bainbridge
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allegedly said, "'Get into the back room or I'll blow your' -- or, you know, 'I'll kill you'
type thing." (Id., p.883.) Bainbridge then pulled out a pocketknife, handed it to Sivak
and told him to "cut her throat." (Id., p.884.) Sivak responded, "'You're nuts,' you
know, 'I can't do anything like this."' (Id.) Bainbridge then "kneel[ed] down by Dixie
and all I can remember seeing is the arm going up and down." (Id., p.885.) "All of a
sudden [Bainbridge] [stood] up and he start[ ed] pulling the trigger on the gun. . . . All I
heard was, just a lot of shots. And then all of a sudden: click, click, click, like an empty
gun." (Id., p.996.) "And then [Bainbridge] grab[bed] her shirt and all, and just pull[ ed]
up on it with her in the sitting position and lifts." (Id., p.887.) Bainbridge then stated,
"Well let's go on out front" while pointing the .22 at Sivak, but first taking the money
from the till and the money bag. (Id., pp.887-88.)
Sivak also admitted he was in the gun cabinet at Marion's employer (id., pp.85962) and that he stole the .22 used to murder Dixie (id., pp.958-60). After detailing the
events surrounding Dixie's murder, Sivak explained how they hid the guns and
ammunition, eliminated other evidence associated with her murder, went to Denny's,
purchased a starter for the van, repaired the van and departed.

(Id., pp.890-901.)

Incredibly, during his allocution at his resentencing, Sivak changed his story and
contended he lied about stealing the gun. (Tr., pp.548-54.)
The prosecutor's cross-examination of Sivak revealed extensive inconsistencies,
both internally and with the physical and forensic evidence and other witnesses'
testimony. (#14435, Tr., pp.934-1011.) The inconsistencies were so obvious that on
redirect Sivak conceded his attorneys had "been telling [him] that there are some weak
spots in [his] testimony such as [those] pointed out by Mr. Harris." (Id., p.1013.)
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Although the Ninth Circuit ordered that Sivak be resentenced, the court
recognized the strength of the state's case regarding guilt, concluding, "The jury heard
and rejected Sivak's contentions that he knew nothing about the plan to commit robbery
and/or murder, that he did not participate in the robbery or murder, and that he was
threatened into assisting Bainbridge cover up the crimes," Sivak, 658 F.3d at 913, which
the district court noted during Sivak's resentencing. (Tr., p.581.) The district court also
concluded Sivak's trial testimony and allocution were not credible (id., p.582) and that
his new explanation for how the .22 got to the murder scene was "ridiculous" (id., p.585).
The manner in which Dixie was murdered was so egregious that the district court
recognized, "The victim tragically remained alive, during this torturous ordeal, for a long
period of time thereafter" and "[n]o one could have killed [Dixie] in this manner and had
any possible regard for [her] life." (#14435, R., p.137.) In discussing why the death
penalty was initially imposed, the district court explained, "This defendant actively
participated in the brutal savage slaying and sexually molesting of a woman while at the
same time butchering her alive." (Id.) While the state was only requesting a fixed life
sentence at Sivak's resentencing, the prosecutor appropriately recognized, "Those words
were as true in 1981 as they are today." (Tr., p.425.) The facts surrounding Dixie's
murder are so egregious that they demand an exceptionally severe measure of retribution
and deterrence, irrespective of the state's inability to prove "which hand the knife was in
or that the knives were in" or "who pulled the trigger or if the gun changed hands and
both people pulled the trigger" (id., p.426), particularly in light of the fact that Bainbridge
has also been given a fixed life sentence that was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 247, 787 P.2d 231 (1990).
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The state recognizes the Idaho Supreme Court '"has given great weight to the age
of a defendant,"' State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144, 814 P.2d 401 (1991) (quoting
State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 79, 577 P.2d 1123 (1978)), which Sivak contends was not
adequately considered by the district court. (Brief, pp.7-8.) However, the mere age of a
murderer does not warrant the imposition of a lesser sentence than fixed life where "the
perpetrator could never be safely released back into society or . . . the nature of the
offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150
Idaho at 876. For example, in State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 600-01, 261 P.3d 853
(2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court viewed a sixteen-year-old murderer's fixed life
sentence "in light of the gravity of the offense and the need to protect society from the
defendant" and concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. Draper's codefendant, who was also a minor, was likewise given a fixed life sentence which was
affirmed on appeal, State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484, 272 P.3d 417 (2012), even
though the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "It was simply unnecessary for the State to
prove Adamcik inflicted the fatal wound," id at 463. See also State v. Carver, 155 Idaho
489, 494-97, 314 P.3d 171 (2013) (affirming a twenty-one-year-old murderer's fixed life
sentence); Windom, 150 Idaho at 876-81 (affirming a sixteen-year-old murderer's fixed
life sentence); State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 619-21, 21 P.3d 940 (Ct. App. 2001)
(affirming a twenty-year-old murderer's fixed life sentence); State v. McKnight, 135
Idaho 440, 441-42, 19 P.3d 64 (Ct. App. 2000) (same); State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
276-79, 1 P.3d 299 (Ct. app. 2000) (affirming an eighteen-year-old murderer's fixed life
sentence); State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 408-09, 807 P.2d 610 (1991) (same).
Obviously, if juveniles and adults younger than Sivak can be sentenced to fixed life after
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having committed brutal murders, Sivak can be sentenced to fixed life where he was
twenty-two at the time he mercilessly and brutally murdered Dixie.
Sivak next contends the district court did not adequately consider his potential for
rehabilitation, which is based primarily upon the "comprehensive social history" (CSH)
compiled by Dr. Pablo Stewart. (Brief, pp.9-12.) However, the district court obviously
considered the prospects of rehabilitation by stating it did "not find that [Sivak's]
character and attitude indicate that the commission of another crime is unlikely." (Tr.,
p.585.) Moreover, the CSH compiled by Dr. Stewart should be given little if any weight
because there is no indication he is qualified to render expert opinions; there is no resume
or curriculum vitae establishing anything more than he is an "M.D." and "Psychiatric
Consultant." (CHS, p. l.) Indeed, he expressly notes that he does "not offer a medical
diagnosis regarding [Sivak]," but merely discusses various diagnoses allegedly given by
others without attaching the reports or the other individuals' qualifications. (Id., p.2.)
Dr. Stewart makes several conclusions that are based upon nothing more than supposition
and speculation. For example, when he interviewed Marion, Dr. Stewart learned that
when she was a child she lived in very poor circumstances requiring that she bathe once a
week in the same water used by her brothers. (CHS, p.20.) Apparently, based upon this
single fact, Dr. Stewart "had the impression that she was likely the victim of sexual abuse
as a child." (Id.) There is simply no basis or support for this conclusion.
More importantly, Dr. Stewart's CHS ignores Sivak's behavior while he's been
incarcerated. Warden Randy Blades, who knew Sivak for ten years while Sivak was
incarcerated (Tr., p.144), reported that over the years Sivak has been incarcerated since
murdering Dixie in 1981, Sivak had 113 disciplinary offense reports (DOR) (Tr., pp.148-
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49).

Incredibly, Sivak contends his "long history of behavioral write-ups do[es] not

evince a future dangerousness or a likelihood that [he] will commit acts of violence in the
future." (Brief, p.11.) Nothing could be farther from the truth, particularly since at least
seven of his DORs involved the possession of weapons. (Tr., p.149.) Blades discussed
an incident where sewing needles were hidden in Sivak's legal paperwork "to poke
officers in the event that they try to look at his legal work." (Id., p.188.) Moreover, as
Blades explained, the large number of DORs is particularly compelling "when you
consider [Sivak] is in a cell 23 hours a day, so not a lot of access to things to get in
trouble with unless it's at [his] cell door or being escorted someplace." (Id., pp.149-50.)
Blades noted some prisoners "do a significant amount of time with zero DO Rs," and that
"113 is in the top 1 percent." (Id., p.150.) Blades recognized Sivak was "given many
more warnings than he received DORs," and because of Sivak's behavior he had to
change procedures "in order to manage" him. (Id., pp.189-90.) Blades further explained
that Sivak had "a total disregard of rules, even sanctions themselves to try to correct that
behavior" (id., p.150) to the extent that prison officials stopped issuing DORs because it
was a waste of resources since Sivak refused to change his behavior (id., p.155).
Addressing whether Sivak would be "dangerous to the public," Blades opined, "with
[Sivak's] total disregard for our rules and in return societal rules, I would be very
concerned about him following those on the outside, and about revenge. I mean, there's
particularly female staff, he fixates, and sends me mounds of paperwork calling them
names and things like that, and I'm concerned about my staff." (Id., p.160.)
Moreover, Sivak has prior convictions for burglary that ultimately resulted in his
being given a five-year prison sentence. (PSI, p.6.) While in prison, Sivak was found in

16

possession of a handcuff key, a list of towns between the prison and Canada, a list of
radio frequencies and radio locations, and the number of Idaho State Police units in
different areas. (Id., p.8.) Based upon his possession of such items, it was reasonable for
prison officials to infer Sivak was planning an escape. (Id.)
Lieutenant Gretchen Woodland, who knew Sivak "fairly well" from her tenure at
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI) where he was housed, explained Sivak
does not change his behavior even after being punished and that she would be
"concerned" about releasing him into the community "[i]ust from knowing him within
the facility and constantly trying to manipulate, not follow[ing] policy, not follow[ing]
procedures, and that's in a prison setting. I would be very concerned for him to be in the
public." (Id., pp.198-99.) Lieutenant Jacqueline Todd also knew Sivak from her tenure
at IMSI and explained Sivak does not follow rules, but "just goes on like there's no
sanctions." (Id., p.216.) When asked whether Sivak would be a "danger outside the
prison," Todd responded, "Yes," and that she believes "he is going to show up at [her]
house," that she doesn't trust him, and "[he] is just evil." (Id., p.218.)
Contrary to Sivak's contention, his history indicates he cannot be rehabilitated
and will always be an extraordinary threat to society. The state acknowledges his current
health problems with bladder cancer. (Id., pp.266-85.) However, because of treatments
that have been provided, as of July 9, 2013, "there was no disease recurrence." (Id.,
p.281.) Irrespective, Sivak's health issues, alleged abusive childhood, and substance
abuse issues pale in comparison to the manner in which he savagely murdered Dixie, his
utter lack of rehabilitative potential, and the need to protect society.

17

Finally, Sivak contends that he has "strong support from his mother and other
family and friends."

(Brief, p.16.)

However, this alleged "support" should not be

considered as mitigation, but aggravation because these individuals refuse to recognize
the truth associated with Dixie's murder and are nothing more than enablers, particularly
Marion. As explained by Dr. Stewart, when he interviewed Marion he found her to be
"regressed, almost childlike." (CSH, p.20.) Incredibly, her home was "furnished in a
bizarre manner" with a collection of dolls, "a great deal of junk," and a "light switch
shaped like a penis." (Id.) Dr. Stuart opined, "Lacey was also raised by a mother who
could not maintain healthy boundaries between mother and son. She was his best friend
and main companion: she doted on Lacey and encouraged his immaturity and
irresponsibility."

(CSH, p.41.)

One of the claims before the Ninth Circuit was the

district court's alleged exposure to "'stories' and 'rumors' about Sivak having an
'unnatural relationship' with his mother," with some individuals "mistakenly refer[ing] to
[Sivak's] mother as his wife on several occasions." Sivak, 658 F.3d at 922-23.
While Sivak also submitted multiple letters of support and testimony from nonfamily members, the letters are from 1988 when he was resentenced to death. (R., p.734,
Exhibit 3.) There is no indication these individuals are currently alive, let alone that they
are willing to "support him in his attempt to reintegrate into society." (Brief, p.17.)
Similarly, the "testimony" upon which Sivak relies is from his 1988 resentencing that
was read to the district court, including Marion's prior testimony.

(Tr., pp.291-377.)

Only Pastor Philip Falk provided live testimony, explaining he was willing to continue
being Sivak's spiritual advisor. (Id., pp.378-89.) While Pastor Falk opined Sivak is
"honest," not "malicious," and that Sivak's problems inside the prison setting would not
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translate into problems in a free society outside of prison (id., pp.386-88), Pastor Falk's
opinion is clearly contrary to Sivak's thirty-three-year prison history, the testimony of
prison officials who dealt with Sivak on a daily basis, and the savage manner in which he
brutally murdered Dixie for which he has never demonstrated any remorse.
The district court appropriately examined the factors of sentencing, particularly
protection of society and those in LC. § 19-2521. (Id., pp.583-85.) Sivak has failed,
under any reasonable view of the facts, to establish the district court abused its discretion
by imposing a fixed life sentence.

IL
This Court Is Barred From Addressing Sivak's Rule 35 Argument Regarding Leniency
Because It Is Being Raised For The First Time On Appeal
A.

Introduction
Because he failed to provide any additional evidence to support his Rule 35

motion, Sivak merely contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule
35 motion "because his sentence was excessive as initially imposed."

(Brief, p.17.)

Sivak's claim fails because he is raising the issue of leniency for the first time on appeal
since his Rule 35 motion was based upon the allegations that his fixed life sentence was
illegal because "life without parole means thirty years" and his sentence was not imposed
by a jury.

Irrespective, his claim fails because he provided no additional evidence

warranting a reduction in his sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is a plea for leniency addressed to the

sound discretion of the district court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,319, 144 P.3d 23

19

(2006). To prevail, the defendant must show the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838 (2007).

C.

Sivak's Rule 35 Motion Was Not A Plea For Leniency
Sivak's Rule 35 motion was not a request for leniency, but an allegation that his

sentence is illegal because "life without parole means thirty years" and since he was
arrested on April 8, 1981, he contends his sentence expired on April 8, 2011. (R., p.543.)
Sivak further contended his sentence is illegal because the state initially filed a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty and, therefore, he was entitled to jury sentencing. (Id.,
pp.543-44.) For the first time on appeal, Sivak contends his Rule 35 motion was a plea
for leniency. (Brief, pp.17-18.)

It is well settled that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider issues not raised
in the court below." State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830,833,252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992)). This
general principle of appellate law has been applied to motions under I.C.R. 35 with the
Idaho Supreme Court explaining, "the issue of 'illegality' may not be raised for the first
time on appeal without the trial court having first had an opportunity to consider the
legality of the terms of the sentence." State v. Howard, 122 Idaho 9, 10, 830 P.2d 520
(1992); see also State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 896, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A
claim of an illegal sentence is not an issue that may be presented for the first time on
appeal."). There is no reason to believe the same principle does not apply to a request for
leniency being raised for the first time on appeal. Because the issue was not raised before
the district court, this Court should decline to address the merits of Sivak's claim.
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However, even if this Court addresses the merits of Sivak' s claim it fails because
he failed to present the district court with any additional evidence to support a plea for
leniency. To prevail on the merits of his claim, Sivak must "show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838 (2007). Because Sivak concedes "[n]either [he] nor his counsel presented any new
information or documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion" (Brief, p.18), he has
failed to meet his burden. Nevertheless, Sivak contends the district court should have
reduced his sentence "because the sentence was excessive as originally imposed." (Brief,
p.18.) Even if Sivak were not required to provide the district court with new or additional
information to support his Rule 35 motion, it fails because, as explained above, under any
reasonable view of the facts, he has failed to establish the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a fixed life sentence.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Sivak's first life sentence for Dixie's firstdegree murder and the denial of his Rule 35 motion be affirmed.
DATED this

J1h day of October, 2014.

L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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